Journal of Beijing Normal University(Social Sciences) ›› 2025, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (6): 145-156.
• Economic Growth and Development • Previous Articles Next Articles
ZHANG Wanming
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Abstract: In the credit market,information asymmetry makes it difficult for lenders to assess borrowers' credit risk,thereby affecting the efficiency of financial resource allocation.This paper constructs a theoretical analysis framework and combines it with adjustments to the Morgan Stanley Capital International Index in 2018 and 2019 to empirically test the relationship between ESG incentive policies,information asymmetry,and financial resource misallocation.The study shows that under the condition of satisfying the separating equilibrium,ESG incentive policies can effectively increase analysts' attention and the level of attention to research reports,reduce information asymmetry between enterprises and financial institutions,and thus effectively alleviate the problem of financial resource misallocation faced by enterprises.This conclusion remains reliable after a series of robustness tests.Further research reveals that the effect of ESG incentive policies on alleviating financial resource misallocation exhibits structural characteristics,especially prominent among private enterprises,innovation companies focusing on specific fields,and those voluntarily disclosing ESG information.This paper extends the economic impact of ESG to the field of financial resource misallocation,providing a new research perspective for alleviating the issue of financial resource misallocation.
Key words: ESG incentive policies, information asymmetry, financial resource misallocation, multi-period DID
CLC Number:
F270.7
ZHANG Wanming. ESG Incentive Policies,Information Asymmetry and Financial Resource Misallocation[J]. Journal of Beijing Normal University(Social Sciences), 2025, 0(6): 145-156.
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