Abstract: The “buck-passing account of value” interprets value by reasons,providing an analyzable notion of value and revealing the fundamental role of reason in normative ethics.The criticisms it faces include three aspects:“providing reasons for approval attitude” does not fully equates to “valuable”;reasons may still need to be further explained by value;and the decisions on action lead by this account cannot balance duties and consequences well.The “Buck-passing account” was developed as a criticism of Moore's position,but the value it accounts for is not the intrinsic value that Moore used to guide the inference of reason,and the reasons it uses to explain value are not the normative reasons Moore derived from value.If we limit the value to be explained in the “buck-passing account” to the value of action,then we will be able to explain intrinsic value in terms of normative reasons.It may respond to Moore morevigorously.“Buck-passing account” for the value of action provides an explanation of how reasons canconfirm valuable action,offers reasons for action that need not be further reduced to value,and can balance consequences and duties through reason weighing in a concise manner.It can avoid various criticisms the “buck-passing account of value” is facing and provide effective guidance for action.

Key words: buck-passing account, value, reason, action